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ABSTRACT
We investigate tax-induced profit shifting in Brazil and the impact of tax havens on the shifting behavior of firms. Profit 
shifting research in Brazil is virtually non-existent, although the shifting incentives in Brazil are prominent. Our research 
fills this gap with evidences in the novel Brazilian context. Profit shifting is a tax-minimization strategy where multinational 
enterprises perform intra-firm transactions to allocate taxable profits to low-tax locations. Brazil combines a remarking set 
of profit shifting incentives, especially a high corporate tax rate, extremely complex tax system, and distinguished transfer 
pricing rules. Further researches may leverage from the shifting incentives in Brazil, since it provides opportunities to 
investigate additional factors that affect the shifting behavior of firms. We analyze 989 transaction-by-country observations 
for the period of 2010-2017. Baseline analysis follows the robust least squares approach with controlling covariates. Linear 
estimate model derives from the conventional Cobb-Douglas production function, to analyze the impact of shifting incentives 
on profit maximization. We find that Brazilian firms have a high level of intra-firm transactions with related parties located 
in low-tax countries, especially with tax havens. It represents a strong evidence of profit shifting behavior in Brazilian firms.
Keywords: profit shifting, transfer pricing, tax havens, base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Profit shifting is a well-known tax avoidance strategy 
where multinational enterprises (MNE) perform 
transactions with foreign related parties, thus to transfer 
taxable profits from high-tax to low-tax countries. One 
of the most traditional profit shifting channels refers to 
the manipulation of transfer prices, when companies 
make tax-induced adjustments on intra-firm prices. 
A key advantage of the profit-shifting strategy is that 
taxable profits are not hidden or omitted, but they are 
merely allocated to a specific country with a low-tax 
rate. Existing studies provide relevant evidences of profit 
shifting by means of direct transfer-pricing manipulation 
(Bartelsman & Beetsma, 2003; Bernard, Jensen, & Schott, 
2006; Clausing, 2003; Cristea & Nguyen, 2016; Davies, 
Martin, Parenti,& Toubal, 2018; Overesch, 2006; Swenson, 
2001). 
Governments worldwide are long-time aware about 
the harming effects of profit shifting and have historically 
implemented several mechanisms to curb this practice. The 
predominant approach established by the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
states that transfer prices must comply with the arm’s 
length principle for they must be comparable with 
the prices established under independent conditions 
(OECD, 2013, 2017). In spite of this requirement, some 
studies show that MNE are able to exploit weaknesses 
and blindspots in countries’ tax rules, thus to distort 
transfer prices (Beer & Loeprick, 2015; Davies et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, MNE are able to override the anti-shifting 
rules by taking advantage of the so called “tax havens”, 
which are jurisdictions with favorable tax regimes and 
weak tax enforcement, which usually have little to none 
tax provisions on transfer prices (Desai, Foley, & Hines, 
2006; Dharmapala, 2014; Lohse, Riedel,& Spengel, 2012). 
In this case, the MNE can shift taxable profits away from 
the high-tax countries while reducing the chances of 
penalization from the host countries.
Profit shifting is one of the most fundamental research 
subjects in the international tax literature, especially 
on accounting and economics and current researchers 
accumulate striking evidences on that account (Beer, 
de Mooji,& Liu, 2018; Heckemeyer & Overesch, 2017; 
Knoll & Riedel, 2014; Riedel, 2018). Some initial studies 
analyze profit shifting on an aggregate level, focusing on 
the influence of cross-country tax differentials and the 
patterns of internal trades and firms’ global profitability 
(Desai et al., 2006; Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013; 
Heckemeyer & Overesch, 2017; Taylor & Richardson, 
2012). Further studies obtain more direct evidences by 
means of direct inspection of intra-firm transactions. 
Results show that differences between the arm’s length 
prices and intra-firm transfer prices vary systematically 
with tax differentials (Bartelsman & Beetsma, 2003; 
Bernard et al., 2006; Clausing, 2003; Cristea & Nguyen, 
2016; Davies et al., 2018; Overesch, 2006; Swenson, 2001). 
For a comprehensive review of the current profit shifting 
research, see Dharmapala (2014), Beer et al. (2018), and 
Riedel (2018).
Despite being a well-established subject in tax literature, 
profit shifting research in Brazil is virtually non-existent. 
The only study dedicated to investigate international profit 
shifting in Brazil is the one of Rathke (2014), which finds 
that Brazilian firms are able to transfer taxable profits 
away from Brazil, therefore resulting in a reduction of 
the total tax burden of the Brazilian consolidated group. 
Brazil provides a favorable context for the profit shifting 
research, since it combines an extremely high corporate 
taxation, one of the most complex tax systems in the world 
(Jacob, 2018), and the most distinguished set of transfer 
pricing (TP) rules in the world (Lohse et al,, 2012). In 
special, the Brazilian TP rules do not follow the arm’s 
length principle, which is the main principle applied by 
the OECD guidelines worldwide (Lohse et al., 2012). 
Several abnormal regulatory characteristics follow from 
this distinction, e.g., TP methods that are inconsistent 
with the OECD guidelines, arbitrary safe-harbor regimes, 
absence of effective mutual agreement procedures, and no 
provisions referring to permanent-establishment status.
This study investigates tax-induced profit shifting 
in Brazil and analyses the impact of tax havens on the 
shifting behavior. We follow the traditional approach and 
identification strategies developed by the current profit 
shifting literature and apply them to the novel Brazilian 
context. Data includes Brazilian listed firms for the 
period 2010-2017 that publish information about intra-
firm transactions in their annual financial statements. 
Results show that Brazilian firms have higher volume 
of transactions with related parties located in countries 
with lower tax rates, i.e., for two foreign countries, results 
show that Brazilian firms have higher volume of intra-
firm transactions with the country that applies the lower 
income tax rate. This result is a strong evidence of profit 
shifting in Brazil, since firms are able to shift taxable profits 
to foreign countries by means of both mispricing and 
volume factors (Clausing, 2000; Riedel, 2018). Moreover, 
our results show that Brazilian firms have an incremental 
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volume of intra-firm transactions with related parties 
located in tax havens. It suggests that the Brazilian firms 
are still attracted by the favorable tax conditions offered by 
tax havens, and the stylized TP requirements established 
in Brazil are not sufficient to completely curb the profit 
shifting.
We obtain original evidences of profit shifting in 
Brazil, for this is the main contribution of this study. 
Existing researches are applied mostly to firms located 
in the United States of America and in the European 
countries, on which the TP rules follow the international 
OECD standards and represent a stringent regulation. We 
obtain relevant results from the novel Brazilian context, 
where the domestic TP rules are arbitrary and do not 
follow the traditional arm’s length principle (Lohse et 
al., 2012). Brazil has one of the highest tax burdens in 
the world (Jacob, 2018), and our findings endorse the 
intuitive perception that Brazilian firms shift taxable 
profits to low-tax countries. This motivates us to advance 
on the investigation of the shifting behavior of firms, thus 
to further develop the profit shifting research in Brazil.
The remaining of this study is structured as follows: 
section 2 presents a model for the profit shifting incentive, 
section 3 describes the data and identification strategy, 
section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
2. A SIMPLE MODEL ON THE PROFIT SHIFTING INCENTIVES
Our model is based on the “concealment costs” 
approach (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Kant, 1988; 
Yitzhaki, 1974) which is based on the expected utility 
theory (von-Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). Overall, 
this theory establishes the main axioms that support the 
maximization decisions under risk and infers that the 
value attributed for the outcomes of the risky decisions 
is the expected utility of the decision maker, based on 
her own evaluations. The expected utility theory is a 
mainstream microeconomic theory that explains the 
incentives that influence the behavior under risk. The 
concealment costs approach is built on the expected utility 
theory, and is the most traditional approach in profit 
shifting literature (Beer et al., 2018; Davies et al., 2018). 
Consider two wholly owned divisions of a vertically 
integrated MNE located in different countries, {i,j} each 
producing outputs xi under costs Ci(xi), bringing revenues 
Ri(si) from sales si(xi). Moreover, one of the divisions i sells 
a share of its outputs m to the other division j ≠ i, charging 
a transfer price p established by the MNE’s headquarter. 
Assume that the intra-firm output m depends on the 
market demand xj for the final product of the purchaser 
division. The pre-tax profits of both divisions are
For simplification, assume that the MNE is subjected 
to the source principle for the taxation of foreign profits, 
and no incremental costs are incurred on transfers of intra-
firm outputs m. For an income tax rate τi ∈ [0,1] in each 
country, the baseline global net profits for both divisions is 
equal to Π = (1 – τi)πi + (1 – τj)πj. Profit shifting incentives 
arise if the tax rates between divisions are different, τi ≠ τj, 
and global net profits Π increases if the MNE is able to 
manage intra-firm transactions pm thus taxable profits 
are transferred from the high-tax country to the low-tax 
country. In special, MNE has discretion in determining 
the transfer price p, therefore the maximizing condition 
∂Π/∂p = (τj – τi)m implies the following two cases:
Low-transfer-price case (LTP):  
𝜏𝜏� � 𝜏𝜏� → 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 � 0; 
 
 
High-transfer-price case (HTP):  
𝜏𝜏� � 𝜏𝜏� → 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 � 0. 
 
 
For the LTP case, the MNE has incentives to charge a 
low transfer price p thus to keep taxable profits in Country 
j, which harms tax revenues in Country i. In the HTP case, 
the MNE maximizes global profits Π by choosing a high 
transfer price p, so to shift taxable profits to Country i 
and harming Country j.
In this scenario, both countries implement domestic 
anti-shifting measures to prevent the intra-firm 
mispricing. The conventional regulatory approach requires 
that the transfer price p must comply with the price p 
determined under the arm’s length condition (OECD, 
2017). Any price deviations Δp = p – p are assessed by 
tax authorities in both countries, which may impose non-
deductible penalties if they understand that the difference 
Δp represents enough evidence of profit shifting. Hence, 
assume that each country implement a set of domestic tax 
rules, such that ∀i,j , Di(Δp) : R → {0,1}, Δp = 0 → Di = 0 is a 
characteristic map which triggers a tax penalty if the price 
deviation Δp is considered a sufficient evidence of profit 
shifting under these rules. In the case of penalization, the 
harmed country requires the payment of the amount of 
 
𝜋𝜋� � ���𝑠𝑠�� � ���𝑠𝑠� � �� � �� ; 
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evaded taxes τi ■ Δpm plus a penalty rate zi > 0 over this 
amount (Yitzhaki, 1974). Therefore, the tax penalty cost 
is represented by a function Zi (Di(Δp)τi ■ Δpm ■ (1 + zi)).






 is the same for all 
matters, such that both countries are not simultaneously 
harmed; it allows us to drop the divisions’ indexes 
hereinafter for simplification. Therefore, the final 
maximization object is equal to
For the tax differential Δτ = τj – τi, the optimal transfer 
price p* is obtained at the maximization level where the 
marginal gains of profit shifting are equal to the marginal 
penalization costs,
This is the fundamental equation of the optimal 
tax-induced TP. Notice that the marginal penalization 
costs at the right hand side of the equality follow the sign of 
the profit shifting direction, Δτ, since the sign of the price 
deviation Δp indicates which country is being harmed, 
i.e., LTP case implies Δτ < 0, Δp < 0 → z = zi, dD/d(Δp) < 0, 
while the HTP case implies Δτ > 0, Δp > 0 → z = zj, dD/d(Δp) > 0. 
In simple terms, it means that profit shifting always 
provides a global (non-negative) gain, regardless if it 
refers to LTP or HTP case, and this gain is increasing up 
to the optimal transfer price p*. It proofs the following:
Proposition 1: tax-induced manipulations of transfer prices always 
increase the global net profits of the MNE up to the optimal transfer 
price p*.
In the implicit form of p*(D-1,Δτ,z), the inverse 
characteristic map D-1 : {0,1} → R refers to the general 
effect of the domestic tax rules of the harmed country; 
note that it is not theoretically necessary for each D(Δp) 
or D-1 to be bijective mappings.
The MNE’s main objective is to obtain maximum 
gains from choosing p*. Net gains from profit shifting are 
computed by comparing the global net income under p* 
with the global net income under the arm’s length price 
p. We obtain the explicit equation
where α(D-1) ∈ [0,1] is a cost parameter for the extent 
of the price deviation Δp that is considered appropriate 
under the TP rules. Of course, parameter α(D-1) is an 
exogenous measure that is not directly observable by 
the MNE and must be estimated. Generalization of the 
cost parameter α(D-1, ■) may include the MNE’s different 
perceptions on the uncertainties related with tax rules and 
tax audits and the MNE’s intrinsic risk aversion (Beer et 
al., 2018; Dharmapala, 2014; Riedel, 2018).
The impact of domestic tax rules is reflected in the cost 
parameter α(D-1). The obvious variation ∂α(D-1)/∂(D-1) ≤ 0 
implies that a more permissive tax rule allows for a wider 
price deviation Δp before triggering the tax penalty z. 
Stricter tax rules imply the opposite. 
In this line, the MNE runs a second maximization 
step with respect to the intra-firm output m. We have
for it is clear that any increase in m implies in an increase 
of the net gains from profit shifting. Therefore, the optimal 
level of intra-firm output m* depends only on the marginal 
rates of substitution between costs ∂Ci/∂m, ∀i,j , and the 
MNE is able to intensify the net gains from profit shifting 
by varying production schedules and manipulating 
inventories turnover. This result proofs the following:
Proposition 2: under optimal conditions regarding the transfer price 
p* and the marginal rates of substitution between costs ∂Ci/∂m, 
∀i,j, increases in intra-firm outputs m always increase the total 
amount of profit shifting, therefore increasing the global net profits 
of the MNE.
In summary, it is extremely convenient for the MNE 
to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax countries by 
means of TP adjustments. It is important to remark 
that the current international anti-shifting standards 
establish TP methods that are substantially flexible. Thus, 
it allows for a certain level of pricing abuse while still 
being considered appropriate by tax authorities (Beer 
et al., 2018; Davies et al., 2018). Moreover, the MNE 
has special incentives to manipulate transfer prices if 
it is subjected to a lenient tax regulation, for it implies 
a lower concealment cost, e.g., the case of tax havens. 
At last, MNE is able to intensify the profit shifting by 
means of the intra-firm outputs m, since there are no 
requirements against any amount m if the transfer price 
p* is considered appropriate. These effects are equally 
present in both LTP and HTP cases.
This analysis yields some relevant predictions. First, 
it is expected that a larger tax differential between two 
countries is positively associated with the volume of intra-
firm transactions between these two countries. It refers to 
 










𝑑𝑑�∆𝜕𝜕� ∙ 𝜏𝜏 ∙ �1� �� ∙ � � 0; 
 
∆𝜏𝜏 � 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ∙
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕









𝑑𝑑�∆𝜕𝜕� ∙ 𝜏𝜏 ∙ �1� �� ∙ � � 0; 
 
∆𝜏𝜏 � 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ∙
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕















𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕  �  ∆𝜏𝜏 𝜏 �𝑝𝑝




𝜕𝜕� � 𝑝𝑝∗� � ���?̅?𝑝��
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕  �  ∆𝜏𝜏 𝜏 �𝑝𝑝




Alex A. T. Rathke
99R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 32, n. 85, p. 95-108, Jan./Apr. 2021
the main profit shifting hypothesis, since a larger volume 
of intra-firm transactions allows the profit shifting by 
means of both mispricing and volume effects. 
Second, it is expected that firms present a larger volume 
of transactions with related parties located in tax havens. 
This prediction reflects the widespread perception from 
tax practitioners and academics, that MNE make use of tax 
havens to reduce global taxation. This issue has received 
increasing importance, especially after the recent tax 
scandals revealed by the media, such as the Paradise Papers 
and the LuxLeaks, and the shifting strategies applied by 
companies such as Starbucks, Alphabet, and Amazon.
We focus on these predictions for the analysis of profit 
shifting in the Brazilian context. Factors related with high 
corporate taxation and intricate tax rules in Brazil provide 
a suitable case for investigation.
3. DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
We focus on the analysis of profit shifting in Brazilian 
listed firms by means of the volume of import and export 
transactions with related parties in other countries. Data 
for intra-firm transactions and firm-level covariates are 
obtained from firms’ annual financial statements for 
the period of 2010-2017. The period of 2010-2017 is 
favorable for our analysis since it refers the worldwide 
implementation of the 2010 OECD’s Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, so our analysis is not affected by heterogeneous 
impacts related with the change in TP rules across 
countries. Likewise, we observe that the ending period of 
2017 since several countries worldwide have implemented 
the Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting by 2018, so our 
analysis is not affected by exogenous effects produced 
by this new tax requirement. The volume of intra-firm 
imports and exports are obtained for individual firms for 
each year segregated by country. The income tax rates 
across countries are obtained from the CBT Tax Database 
of the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation for 
the period of 2010-2017. Countries are classified as tax 
havens for Brazilian taxation purposes according to the 
Brazilian tax rule Instrução Normativa da Receita Federal 
doBrasil (IN RFB) n. 1037/2010. All data is regarded at 
the yearbasis. Since Brazilian firms perform transactions 
with related parties located in several countries, we focus 
on the transaction-by-country as a unit of analysis for 
each year.
For the identification strategy, we follow a similar 
idea developed by Hines and Rice (1994), which is the 
baseline approach in profit shifting literature (Beer et al., 
2018). Hines and Rice (1994) derive a simple estimation 
for the non-shifted profits based on the traditional 
Cobb-Douglas production function, where the firm’s 
real output is a function of the main production factors. 
The standard Cobb-Douglas production function is 
equal to Q = LβK1-β, where Q is the firm’s output, L and 
K are the production factors related with labor and 
capital, respectively, and β is a regularized production 
parameter. 
As described in section 2, the profit shifting incentive 
arises if tax rates are different across countries; therefore 
the amount of intra-firm output is likely to be associated 
with the magnitude and the direction of the tax differential. 
Moreover, the existence of further tax favorable conditions 
for the profit shifting to arise may also affect the amount 
of intra-firm outputs, i.e., for Q as the intra-firm output, 
both the tax differential Δτ and the taxhaven condition 
affect Q such that Q(Δτ,T) = f(Δτ) ■TLβK1-β, where f(Δτ) 
is a function for the impact of the profit shifting incentive 
and T is a parameter for the tax haven. Based on this 
design, simple linearization derives the following baseline 
regression model (Hines & Rice, 1994).
where γ is the estimate parameter for the profit shifting 
incentive, μ is the estimate parameter for the effect of the 
tax haven, X is a matrix of l covariates representing the 
log of the production factors, and βl is a vector for the 
parameters of the covariates. Production factors include 
labor costs, firms’ resources invested in productive assets 
and inventories turnover, and fixed sector parameters for 
the effect of industry technology; these are the traditional 
production factors related with the operational outputs 
of the firm (Hines & Rice, 1994). Covariates also include 
macroeconomic indicators for each country related with 
the GDP and distance, thus to account for the effect of 
the economic activity of each country. Indexes for firm, 
year, and country are absent from the regression equation 
for simplification. Our analysis focuses on the volume 
of intra-firm output as the dependent variable, thus to 
conform with the core of the Cobb-Douglas approach. 
We apply the baseline regression model for our 
investigation. We expect to find both estimate coefficients 
γ and μ to be positive.
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4. ANALYSIS
This section presents the descriptive statistics, the baseline regression results for the profit shifting in Brazil, and 








989 468.4 4,030.7 0.0 57,026.0
Labor expenses 648 1,180.23 2,263.61 2.1 29,732.1
PPE 989 4,926.0 32,768.3 0.0 629,830.9
Inventories – Net 987 1,864.2 3,118.3 3.6 29,057.2
Revenues – Net 989 17,479.0 36,270.2 245.7 321,638.0
Assets – Total 989 19,163.5 52,835.9 145.8 900,135.1
Capital 
expenditures
984 1,033.3 4,198.3 3.0 71,311.0
Liabilities – Total 989 12,593.6 35,738.6 74.1 645,403.9
Costs and expenses 
– Total
989 15,801.0 33,250.5 226.8 259,224.0
Country-level
Income tax rate– 
Foreign (%)
336 27.0 8.1 0.0 35.0
Tax differential (%) 336 7.0 8.1 -1.0 34.0
GDP (US$ 
000.000.000)
336 3,903.2 5,963.3 3.4 19,390.6
GDP ratio (US$) 336 1.8 2.8 0.0 10.4
Distance from 
Brazil – Regularized
42 0.4072 0.2411 0.0672 1.0000
Foreign countries (n) 42
Tax havens (n) 18
Years (n) 8
Industries (n) 7
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the firm-level and country-level variables. All variables are obtained at a 
yearbasis. All firm-level variables are presented in millions of Brazilian reals (R$ 000.000). Volume of intra-firm transactions refer 
to the sum of the amount of import and export transactions with related parties, for each sample firm, for each year. Revenues 
refer to the total revenues from sales minus sales deductions. All firm-level variables are obtained from the firms’ annual financial 
statements. Country-level variables are presented according to the type of variable. Tax differential refers to the difference 
between the Brazilian marginal tax rate of 34% and the income tax rate on the country of the related party, for each year. 
Annual gross domestic product (GDP) ratio refers to the ratio between the GDP of the foreign country and the GDP in Brazil, for 
each year. Data for GDP by country is obtained from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Statistics database. Distance from Brazil is regularized on the range [0,1]. Countries are classified as tax havens according to 
the Brazilian tax rule Instrução Normativa da Receita Federal do Brasil (IN RFB) n. 1037/2010. Since firms perform intra-firm 
transactions with related parties in several countries, we obtain a repeated-firm database; we focus on the transaction-by-country 
as a unit of analysis. Additional details on the data are presented in section 3.
PPE = net balances of plant, property and equipment; SD = standard deviation.
Source: Elaborated by the author.
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Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the firm-
level and country-level data. We obtain a total of 989 
transaction-by-country observations for the complete 
period of 2010-2017. Some variables are not available 
for all observations, e.g., labor expenses and inventories. 
Preliminary analysis of the descriptive numbers provides 
some insights about the data structure. We observe that 
the volume of intra-firm transactions has a wide variation 
range, with the max amount on about 14 times the 
standard deviation. This strongly suggests the existence 
of outliers in our sample. Moreover, Table 1 shows that 
the income tax rate across countries has a mean of 27%, 
and it varies within the range of (0.0-35.0%). It indicates 
that the Brazilian marginal tax rate of 34% is among the 
highest tax rates of our sample; therefore, it reinforces 
the existence of shifting incentives for Brazilian firms.
4.2 Baseline Results
We first compute the estimate coefficients for the 
baseline model derived in section 3 omitting the parameter 
for tax havens T, thus to address the influence of the 
fundamental profit shifting incentive Δτ on the volume 
of intra-firm transactions. Traditional production factors 
refer to labor expenses, fixed assets and inventories (Hines 
& Rice, 1994). All firm-level covariates are regularized 
with respect to total net revenues or total assets, to allow 
for comparability (details in Table 2 further). Hence, 
estimates are computed with respect to the monotone 
transformation log(1 + variable) for the regularized 
variables, so to account for the constraints of the log-
transformation range. Moreover, we include industry-level 
and country-level controls in our estimates. Since we have 
a repeated-firm database, the homogeneous year-level 
effects are captured by the firm-level covariates.
Notice that the descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest 
the existence of potential outliers in our sample. We apply 
the traditional Bonferroni adjustment on studentized 
residuals on preliminary estimates, which reveals the 
existence of 10 outlier observations in our sample. These 
outliers are dropped from our analyses from now on. 
Initial results are presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Regression estimates – Profit shifting incentive Δτ
Estimate coefficients: γ, βl
Variables 1 2 3 4
Tax Param.: log(f(Δτ)) = Δτ
0.1330 * 0.1404 * 0.1683 * 0.1917 *
0.0404 0.0411 0.0466 0.0292
Labor expenses
-0.0394 -0.0230 -0.0418 -0.0285
0.0228 0.0252 0.0234 0.0249
PPE
0.0723 * 0.0081 0.0720 * 0.0065
0.0228 0.0283 0.0231 0.0191
Inventories
-0.1061 -0.0142 -0.1070 -0.0102
0.0599 0.0495 0.0594 0.0457
Industry-level controls N Y N Y
Country-level controls N N Y Y
Observations (n) 638 638 638 638
F-statistics 16.30 ** 14.33 ** 12.27 ** 13.37 **
R-squared adjusted 0.0877 0.1730 0.0959 0.1889
Note: This table presents the estimate coefficients γ, βl for the baseline regression model, excluding outlier observations from the 
sample. Numbers in plain refer to the estimate coefficients. Numbers in italic refer to the estimates’ standard errors. Standard 
errors are obtained from the White›s covariance matrices to account for heteroscedastic consistency. Outliers are selected based 
on the traditional Bonferroni adjustment on studentized residuals of initial baseline estimates. Derivation of the baseline model 
is presented in section 3. Details about all variables are presented in section 3 and Table 1. Column 1 presents the estimate 
coefficients with no controls for industry or country effects. Column 2 includes industry-level fixed controls only. Column 3 
includes country-level controls only. Column 4 includes industry-level and country-level effects. Variables related with the 
amount of intra-firm transactions and labor expenses are regularized with respect to the total net revenues for each firm, for 
each year. Variables related with plant, property and equipment (PPE) and inventories are regularized with respect to the total 
assets for each firm, for each year. Estimates are computed with respect to the monotone transformation log(1 + variable) for 
the dependent variable and the firm-level covariates. Fixed controls for industry effects refer to an indicator variable for the 
firm’s industry sector. Controls for country effects refer to the ratio between annual gross domestic product (GDP) of the foreign 
country and the annual GDP in Brazil, and the distance between Brazil and the foreign country.
N = no; Y = yes.
* t statistic significative at < 0.01 level; ** F-statistic significative at < 0.01 level.
Source: Elaborated by the author.
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The estimate coefficient γ for the variable of interest 
Δτ is significative in magnitude and direction for all cases 
presented in Table 2, thus supporting the profit shifting 
hypothesis. It indicates that Brazilian firms have a larger 
volume of intra-firm transactions with related parties 
located in jurisdictions with lower income tax rates. 
Remark that discounting the regularizations and log 
transformation of variables, we obtain the effect
where R is the total net revenues for each firm, individual 
indexes omitted. Therefore, Table 2 suggests that a 
variation of 1%-unit in the tax differential produces a 
semi-elasticity effect of about 13-to-19% on average over 
the volume of intra-firm transactions with respect to 
the total amount of firms’ transactions and sales. This 
result is significative for variations in industry-level and 
country-level controls. 
We may explore how the estimate coefficient γ in 
Table 2 behaves after some additional variations in the 
model. Firstly, we remark that the estimates in Table 2 
assume the equality log(f(Δτ)) = Δτ for simplification. In 
this sense, we can apply the monotone transformation 
log(f(Δτ)) = log(1 + Δτ) for the tax differential as well, 
consistent with the other transformed parameters. Also, 
we compute the estimate coefficients by direct linear 
regression with respect to all regularized parameters. At 
last, we apply the inverse transformation 1/(τ + 0.1) as in 
Grubert and Mutti (2000) for the foreign tax variable τ, 
thus to analyze the magnified effect of very low-tax rates 
on profit shifting (Azémar, 2010; Clausing, 2000; Grubert 
& Mutti, 2000). The new estimates γ’ obtained from each 
specification are presented in Table 3.
Table 3
Regression estimates – Profit shifting incentiveΔτ, model variations
Estimate coefficient: γ’
Tax Param.: log(f(Δτ)) 1 2 3 4
1. log(1 + Δτ)
0.1428 * 0.1497 * 0.1845 * 0.2096 *
0.0280 0.0444 0.0510 0.0327
(13.37) ** (14.09) ** (12.01) ** (13.18) **
2. Δτ, direct linear reg.
0.1571 * 0.1666 * 0.1962 * 0.2245 *
0.0490 0.0502 0.0565 0.0344
(16.78) ** (14.48) ** (12.37) ** (13.36) **
3. 1/(τ + 0.1)
0.0105 * 0.0112 * 0.0114 * 0.0131 *
0.0033 0.0034 0.0035 0.0037
(17.02) ** (15.02) ** (12.15) ** (13.28) **
Firm-level covariates Y Y Y Y
Industry-level controls N Y N Y
Country-level controls N N Y Y
Observations (n) 638 638 638 638
Note:This table presents the estimate coefficients γ’ for the variations in the model specification, excluding outlier observations 
from the sample. Numbers in plain refer to the estimate coefficients γ’. Numbers in italic refer to the estimates’ standard errors. 
Numbers in parentheses refer to the Fstatistic of each regression. Standard errors are obtained from the White’s covariance 
matrices to account for heteroscedastic consistency. Outliers are selected based on the traditional Bonferroni adjustment on 
studentized residuals of preliminary baseline estimates. Derivation of the baseline model is presented in section 3. Details about 
all variables are presented in section 3 and Table 1. Row 1 refers to the baseline model assuming log(f(Δτ)) = log(1 + Δτ). Row 
2 refers to the estimates obtained from direct linear regression with respect to the regularized parameters, assuming log(f(Δτ)) = 
Δτ. Row 3 refers to the baseline model assuming log(f(Δτ)) = 1/(τ + 0.1), where τ is the marginal tax rate of the foreign country. 
Column 1 presents the estimate coefficients with no controls for industry or country effects. Column 2 includes industry-level 
fixed controls only. Column 3 includes country-level controls only. Column 4 includes industry-level and country-level effects. All 
estimates include the effect of firm-level covariates according to each model specification. Fixed controls for industry effects refer 
to an indicator variable for the firm’s industry sector. Controls for country effects refer to the ratio between annual gross domestic 
product (GDP) of the foreign country and the annual GDP in Brazil and the distance between Brazil and the foreign country.
N = no; Y = yes.
* t statistic significative at <0.01 level; **F-statistic significative at < 0.01 level.
Source: Elaborated by the author.
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We observe that all estimate coefficients γ’ in Table 3 
are significative in magnitude and direction, regardless 
of the specification applied. As expected, results are 
quantitatively consistent with the baseline estimates γ 
in Table 2. For example, for the new estimates based on 
the monotone transformation log(f(Δτ)) = log(1 + Δτ) 
presented in Table 3, row 1, we derive the equality 
γ = γ’/(1 + Δτ). The estimate coefficient γ’ in Table 3, 
row 1, column 1, is equal to γ’ = 0.1428. In this case, 
assuming an average tax differential effect of  Δτ = 0.07 
computed in the descriptive statistics, we have an average 
effect of 0.1428/(1.07) = 0.1335, which is quantitatively 
equivalent to the corresponding baseline estimate 
γ = 0.1330 presented in Table 2. This is true for all 
specifications in Table 3. Hence, the estimates from 
the alternative specifications presented in Table 3 are 
consistent.
Advancing in our analyses, we investigate the effect 
of tax havens on the volume of intra-firm transactions. 
We compute the estimate coefficients for the full baseline 
model in Section 3 and Table 2, and for the alternative 
specifications as presented in Table 3, i.e., by applying 
the monotone transformation log(f(Δτ)) = log(1 + Δτ), 
running the direct linear regression for all regularized 
parameters and applying the inverse transformation 
1/(τ + 0.1). Now, we expect to find both estimate 
coefficients γ and μ to be positive, which refer to the 
coefficients of the profit shifting incentive Δτ and the 
tax haven parameter T, respectively, for each of the 
specifications applied. Firm-level covariates are the same 
as in the initial estimates in Table 2. All estimates include 
industry-level and country-level controls and exclude the 
outliers identified in the preliminary analyses. Estimates 
are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Regression estimates – Profit shifting incentiveΔτ, tax haven parameterT
Estimate coefficients: γ, μ
Variables 1 2 3 4
Tax Param.: log(f(Δτ))
0.1769 * 0.1938 * 0.0116 * 0.2070 *
0.0473 0.0518 0.0035 0.0578
Tax Haven Param.: T∈{0,1}
0.0214 * 0.0216 * 0.0201 * 0.0255 *
0.0053 0.0053 0.0052 0.0063
Firm-level covariates Y Y Y Y
Industry-level controls Y Y Y Y
Country-level controls Y Y Y Y
Observations (n) 638 638 638 638
Obs. tax havens (n) 392 392 392 392
F-statistics 14.52 ** 14.39 ** 14.14 ** 0.1457 **
R-squared adjusted 0.2163 0.2146 0.2114 0.2169
Note:This table presents the estimate coefficients γ, μ for the baseline regression model and variations, excluding outlier 
observations from the sample. Numbers in plain refer to the estimate coefficients. Numbers in italic refer to the estimates’ 
standard errors. Standard errors are obtained from the White’s covariance matrices to account for heteroscedastic consistency. 
Outliers are selected based on the traditional Bonferroni adjustment on studentized residuals of preliminary baseline estimates. 
Derivation of the baseline model is presented in section 3. Details about all variables are presented in section 3 and Table 1. 
Column 1 presents the estimate coefficients for the baseline model assuming log(f(Δτ)) = Δτ. Column 2 presents the estimates 
for the baseline model assuming log(f(Δτ)) = log(1 + Δτ). Column 3 presents the estimates obtained from direct linear regression 
with respect to the regularized parameters, assuming log(f(Δτ)) = Δτ. Column 4 presents the estimates for the baseline model 
assuming log(f(Δτ)) = 1/(τ + 0.1), where τ is the marginal tax rate of the foreign country. Tax haven parameter T refers to an 
indicator variable with value 1 if the foreign related country is located in a tax haven and 0 otherwise. Countries are classified 
as tax havens according to the Brazilian tax rule Instrução Normativa da Receita Federal do Brasil (IN RFB) n. 1037/2010. All 
estimates include the effect of firm-level covariates according to each model specification. Fixed controls for industry effects refer 
to an indicator variable for the firm’s industry sector. Controls for country effects refer to the ratio between annual gross domestic 
product (GDP) of the foreign country and the annual GDP in Brazil and the distance between Brazil and the foreign country.
Y = yes.
* t statistic significative at < 0.01 level; **F-statistic significative at < 0.01 level.
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Results show that both estimate coefficients γ and μ 
are significative for each of the specifications presented in 
Table 4. First, we observe that the profit shifting incentive 
Δτ has a relevant magnitude effect after isolating the 
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influence of tax havens. It means that Brazilian firms are 
able to perform intra-firm transactions to shift profits 
away from Brazil even if the destination country is not 
a tax-favorable location. This result corroborates the 
theoretically prediction, since the Brazilian marginal 
tax rate equal to 34% is close to the max tax rate of 
35% of our sample, and it is substantially higher than 
the global average income tax rate of 27% (Table 1). 
Existing studies show that firms shift profits low-tax 
countries due to the taxhaven status, and they indicate 
the absence of profit shifting to general countries if 
the tax incentive Δτ is weak (Davies et al., 2018). Our 
findings provide the complementary evidences about 
the presence of profit shifting to general countries if the 
incentive Δτ is strong.
Second, we observe that the tax haven effect T is 
significative, thus indicating that Brazilian firms have 
a higher volume of intra-firm transactions with related 
parties located in tax havens. Since T is a discrete 
parameter, overall results in Table 4 suggest that the 
taxhaven status of the destination country produces a 
semi-elastic increment of about 2% on average over the 
volume of intra-firm transactions with respect to the total 
amount of firms’ transactions and sales. Besides, close 
inspection of the outcomes in Table 4 shows that the 
estimate coefficients γ and μ are reasonably consistent in 
magnitude with the baseline analyses in Table 2, e.g., in 
Table 4, column 1, the estimates γ = 0.1769 and μ = 0.0214 
imply a combined mean effect of γ + μ = 0.1983, while the 
corresponding estimate coefficient in Table 2, column 4, 
presents the combined effect of 0.1917. 
In summary, results in tables 2-4 indicate that Brazilian 
firms have a substantially larger volume of transactions 
with related parties located in countries with lower tax 
rates. Moreover, Brazilian firms have an incremental 
volume of intra-firm transactions with related parties 
in tax havens. Results are significative in magnitude 
and direction for all variations in our model, and the 
estimate coefficients are quantitatively consistent across 
all specifications. Our findings represent a strong set of 
evidences on the profit shifting practice in Brazil. This 
is consistent with current evidences, especially in Davies 
et al. (2018) and Beer and Loeprick (2015), which show 
that a significant portion of the firms’ profits are shifted 
by means of tax havens.
4.3 Complementary Analyses
Our baseline findings follow from the theoretical 
developments presented in section 2. We explore some 
further variations in the identification strategy. Firstly, 
remark that the “blacklist” in the Brazilian tax rule IN 
RFB n. 1037/2010 defines two groups of tax havens: the 
first includes countries that are classified as tax havens 
under absolute state, while the second group includes 
countries that are considered tax havens if some conditions 
are satisfied. These conditions refer mostly to the legal 
characteristics of the foreign company. In this scenario, 
we adjust the baseline model to include two mutually 
exclusive parameters T and T’ for the taxhaven status. 
Assume the discrete parameter T referring to countries 
classified as tax havens in absolute, and the discrete 
parameter T’ referring to tax havens if the conditions in 
the Brazilian tax rule are satisfied. We expect to find at least 
one of the estimate coefficients μ or μ’ to be positive, which 
refer to the effect of parameters T and T’, respectively, for 
each of the specifications applied. Results are presented 
in Table 5.
Table 5
Regression estimates – Profit shifting incentiveΔτ, tax haven parameters T and T’
Estimate coefficients: γ, μ, μ’
Variables 1 2 3 4
Tax Param.: log(f(Δτ))
0.1300 * 0.1408 * 0.0079 ** 0.1466 *
0.0331 0.0362 0.0033 0.0377
A.Tax Haven Par.: T∈{0,1}
0.0457 * 0.0474 ** 0.0427 0.0567 **
0.0204 0.0203 0.0245 0.0250
C.Tax Haven Par.: T’∈{0,1}
0.0175 * 0.0174 * 0.0173 * 0.0204 *
0.0052 0.0052 0.0052 0.0061
Firm-level covariates Y Y Y Y
Industry-level controls Y Y Y Y
Country-level controls Y Y Y Y
Observations (n) 638 638 638 638
Obs. A.Tax Havens (n) 57 57 57 57
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Estimate coefficients: γ, μ, μ’
Variables 1 2 3 4
Obs. C.Tax Havens (n) 335 335 335 335
Fstatistics 14.04 *** 14.01 *** 13.44 *** 14.20 ***
R-squared adjusted 0.2227 0.2224 0.2146 0.2249
Note: This table presents the estimate coefficients γ, μ,μ’ for the variations in the baseline model, excluding outlier observations 
from the sample. Numbers in plain refer to the estimate coefficients. Numbers in italic refer to the estimates’ standard errors. 
Standard errors are obtained from the White’s covariance matrices to account for heteroscedastic consistency. Outliers are 
selected based on the traditional Bonferroni adjustment on studentized residuals of preliminary baseline estimates. Derivation of 
the baseline model is presented in section 3. Details about all variables are presented in section 3 and Table 1. Column 1 presents 
the estimate coefficients for the baseline model assuming log(f(Δτ)) = Δτ. Column 2 presents the estimates for the baseline model 
assuming log(f(Δτ)) = log(1 + Δτ). Column 3 presents the estimates obtained from direct linear regression with respect to the 
regularized parameters, assuming log(f(Δτ)) = Δτ. Column 4 presents the estimates for the baseline model, assuming log(f(Δτ)) = 
1/(τ + 0.1), where τ is the marginal tax rate of the foreign country. A.Tax Haven parameter T refers to an indicator variable with 
value 1 if the foreign related country is classified as an absolute tax haven and 0 otherwise. C.Tax Haven parameter T’ refers to 
an indicator variable with value 1 if the foreign related country is classified as a conditional tax haven and 0 otherwise. Countries 
are classified as absolute or conditional tax havens according to the Brazilian tax rule Instrução Normativa da Receita Federal 
do Brasil (IN RFB) n. 1037/2010. All estimates include the effect of firm-level covariates, according to each model specification. 
Fixed controls for industry effects refer to an indicator variable for the firm’s industry sector. Controls for country effects refer to 
the ratio between annual gross domestic product (GDP) of the foreign country and the annual GDP in Brazil and the distance 
between Brazil and the foreign country.
Y = yes.
* t statistic significative at < 0.01 level; ** t statistic significative at < 0.05 level; *** Fstatistic significative at <0.01 level.
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Results in Table 5 ratify the impact of tax havens on 
the shifting behavior of Brazilian firms. Either estimate 
coefficients μ or μ’ are positive and significative for each 
of the specifications, for it shows an incremental volume 
of intra-firm transactions with related parties located in 
tax havens of one type or the other. Besides, the estimate 
coefficient γ for the tax differential Δτ is significative for 
all specifications in Table 5.
Furthermore, we notice some deviations in the effects 
of the firm-level covariates depending on variations in 
the exogenous controls. Specifically, we observe that the 
firm-level covariates are no more significative after the 
inclusion of industry-specific controls in our estimates 
(Table 2). Therefore, we investigate if the main results 
remain the same after changes in the production factors 
in matrix X within the regression model. We explore 
three types of firm-level covariates that may affect firms’ 
outputs: the amount of capital expenditures, the financing 
structure, and the cost structure. Covariates are included 
at the firm-level for each firm, for each year. The effect of 
tax havens is set by two mutually exclusive parameters T 
and T’ for each type of tax haven. All estimates include 
industry-level and country-level controls. Results are 
presented in Table 6. 
Table 6
Regression estimates – Profit shifting incentive Δτ, tax haven parameters T and T’, variation in firm-level covariates
Estimate coefficients: γ, μ, μ’
Variables 1 2 3
Tax Param.: log(f(Δτ)) = Δτ
0.1000 * 0.0944 * 0.1049 *
0.0202 0.0205 0.0218
A.Tax Haven Par.: T∈{0,1}
0.0282 0.0320 ** 0.0288 **
0.0144 0.0139 0.0132
C.Tax Haven Par.: T’∈{0,1}
0.0111 * 0.0114 * 0.0111 *
0.0034 0.0035 0.0035
Firm-level covariates – Type CAPEX FS CS
Industry-level controls Y Y Y
Table 5
Cont.
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Estimate coefficients: γ, μ, μ’
Variables 1 2 3
Country-level controls Y Y Y
Observations (n) 974 979 979
Obs. A.Tax Havens (n) 53 57 57
Obs. C.Tax Havens (n) 335 335 335
F-statistics 18.49 *** 15.73 *** 17.21 ***
R-squared adjusted 0.1774 0.1742 0.1773
Wald test – Fstatistics 8.19 *** 6.28 *** 6.25 ***
Note: This table presents the estimate coefficients γ, μ,μ’ for the regression models of different firm-level covariates in matrix X, 
excluding outlier observations from the sample. Numbers in plain refer to the estimate coefficients. Numbers in italic refer to 
the estimates’ standard errors. Standard errors are obtained from the White’s covariance matrices to account for heteroscedastic 
consistency. Outliers are selected based on the traditional Bonferroni adjustment on studentized residuals of preliminary baseline 
estimates. Derivation of the baseline model is presented in section 3. Details about all variables are presented in section 3 and 
Table 1. Column 1 presents the estimate coefficients including the amount of capital expenditures (CAPEX) of each firm, for each 
year. Column 2 presents the estimates including the components of the financial structure (FS) of each firm, for each year, and 
is composed by the amounts of the short-term leverage, long-term leverage, and shareholders’ equity. Column 3 presents the 
estimates including the components of the operational cost structure (CS) of each firm, for each year, and is composed by the 
amounts of operational costs and operational expenses. A.Tax Haven parameter T refers to an indicator variable with value 1 if 
the foreign related country is classified as an absolute tax haven and 0 otherwise. C.Tax Haven parameter T’ refers to an indicator 
variable with value 1 if the foreign related country is classified as a conditional tax haven and 0 otherwise. Countries are classified 
as absolute or conditional tax havens according to the Brazilian tax rule Instrução Normativa da Receita Federal do Brasil (IN 
RFB) n. 1037/2010. Estimates are computed with respect to the monotone transformation log(1 + variable) for the dependent 
variable and the firm-level covariates. Fixed controls for industry effects refer to an indicator variable for the firm’s industry sector. 
Controls for country effects refer to the ratio between annual GDP of the foreign country and the annual GDP in Brazil and the 
distance between Brazil and the foreign country. Wald test assesses the existence of significative covariates.
Y = yes.
* tstatistic significative at < 0.01 level; ** tstatistic significative at < 0.05 level; *** F-statistic significative at < 0.01 level.
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Results in Table 6 reinforce the main findings in 
section 4.2. The tax-differential effect Δτ is significative 
in magnitude and direction and is consistent across all 
variations presented in Table 6. Under these specifications, 
results suggest that a variation of 1%-unit in the tax 
differential produces a semi-elasticity effect of about 
10% on average over the volume of intra-firm transactions 
with respect to the total amount of firms’ transactions 
and sales. For the taxhaven parameters T and T’, either 
estimate coefficients μ or μ’ are positive and significative 
for each of the specifications. Results suggest an increment 
of about 1-to-3% on average on the volume of intra-firm 
transactions, depending on the taxhaven status of the 
destination country.
In overall, we find strong evidences on the profit 
shifting strategy in Brazil. All results indicate that 
Brazilian firms have a higher volume of intra-firm 
transactions with related parties located in low-tax 
countries. Moreover, Brazilian firms have an incremental 
volume of intra-firm transactions with related parties 
in tax havens. Existing studies indicate that structural 
differences in shifting costs across industries and 
countries affect the semi-elasticity effect of the tax 
differentials over the profit shifting behavior (Beer et 
al., 2018; Heckemeyer & Overesch, 2017), so empirical 
estimates require the inclusion of firm-level and 
country-level profitability controls. In this line, we 
explore several variations on the empirical specification 
in order to obtain cautious estimates. We observe that 
the results in Tables 2-6 are significative in magnitude 
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5. CONCLUSION
This study provides original evidences of the profit 
shifting practice in Brazil. Results are solid, for they are 
invariant to the several robustness tests applied to the 
classical identification strategy.
We observe that the tax-differential effect is 
complemented by the taxhaven effect in Brazil, thus 
suggesting that the existence of slack tax requirements 
in foreign countries creates an additional incentive to 
shift profits away from Brazil. It is publicly known that 
the Brazilian government has a spotlight on jurisdictions 
with favorable tax regimes, in special those included in 
the Brazilian “blacklist”. We observe a larger effect for the 
case where the classification as a tax haven is conditional 
to firm-level characteristics of the foreign related party. 
This is intuitive, since the conditional clause provides 
room for argumentation against a potential inquiry by 
the Brazilian tax authorities.
In this study, profit shifting behavior is captured by 
the volume of transactions of Brazilian firms with foreign 
related parties and with tax havens. Ideally, we would 
prefer to observe the transfer price directly; however, this 
information is not disclosed by firms, for it may represent a 
limitation to our investigation when compared with existing 
studies that analyze individual transfer price (Cristea and 
Nguyen, 2016; Davies et al., 2018). Nonetheless, theory 
shows us that the profit shifting behavior is reflected by 
the manipulation of both transfer prices and intra-firm 
outputs (Beer et al., 2018). Our findings suggest that this 
is the case in the Brazilian context.
Recent studies suggest that if the taxavoidance 
incentives are somewhat weak and the concealment costs 
become expressive, it becomes difficult to observe the 
shifting behavior of firms (Davies et al., 2018). The puzzle 
is to check whether profit shifting is non-existent under 
weak incentives, or if this is a matter of methodological 
limitations (Beer et al., 2018). In contrast, the Brazilian 
context provides a relevant set of incentives for firms to 
shift profits away from the country, which combines an 
extreme income tax rate, great complexity in tax system 
and a quite peculiar TP regulation. It allows more detailed 
analyses on the effect of different anti-shifting measures, 
identification of new firm-level determinants of profit 
shifting, and the effectiveness of multiple shifting channels 
by firms.
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